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Bernard Montgomery, History (Re)writer
The stated goal of Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy is to “bring together the most important Bernard
Montgomery documents for the period 1 January to 20
August 1944, reproduce each of the chosen documents in
full and arrange them in a straightforward chronological order” (p. x). It is fair to say this volume achieves
this goal, even though a batch of Montgomery documents
already reproduced in full in other volumes was not included here.

of Montgomery through rose-colored glasses. For example, although Brooks opines that “the documents show
Montgomery as a brilliant communicator,” he also catalogs Montgomery’s many spats with a wide variety of
military and political figures (p. 2).
Six generalizations emerge from these documents.
First, Montgomery was a skillful, meticulous, determined
organizer who was very good at organizing, mounting,
supporting, and operating an army, even if subsequently
he was not always the optimal decision maker in combat conditions. Second, Montgomery, when he wished to
be, could be both charming and charismatic and evinced
the ability to inspire confidence and increase morale
among his charges. Third, an egotist, Montgomery was
confident he possessed distinctive, superior knowledge
and understanding of the military, how wars should be
fought, and, in particular, how to defeat the Germans. He
regarded the defeat of the Germans in Normandy as evidence of this. Fourth, Montgomery seldom shied away
from the opportunity to criticize or denigrate all but a
few other military leaders and political figures. Fifth, his
scathing comments about his military colleagues of every nationality betray either a brimming self-confidence
of Pattonesque magnitude, or a lurking inferiority complex that motivated him to attempt to cut down numerous contemporaries. Montgomery frequently was unable to admit his own errors or shortcomings. Finally,
Montgomery’s diary appears to have been written with

The precise selection of a much larger set of available
documents (the diaries, letters, and speeches of Montgomery) that appear here is the result of culling and evaluation by Stephen Brooks, who previously performed
a similar task for Montgomery’s North African papers.
Brooks provides some evaluative commentary relating to
the documents (primarily in footnotes) and often guides
readers to other sources on issues of dispute that arise.
Overall, his treatment of “Monty” is gentle and, in contrast to recent histories of the Normandy campaign, he
generally resists skewering Montgomery’s interpretation
of events.
On occasion, he lets Montgomery off the hook rather
easily in his commentary in the 650 valuable footnotes.
Illustrations include British failures to take Caen early on
and Monty’s inability to close the Falaise gap in August
1944. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to conclude that
this collection of 211 Montgomery documents is a view
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an eye to postwar historical analysis. Montgomery seems
to have deliberately shaded his diary comments, and perhaps even revised his views on matters with future historians in mind. When “facts” did not fit his desired narrative, he often revised his story, and soon claimed that
the new version was what he had predicted all along.

a very poor soldier, and has much to learn” (p. 244). It
is hardly an accident that Antony Beevor, the most recent major historian of the Normandy battle, observes,
“Senior Canadian officers detected a supercilious attitude
toward them.”[1] Such an attitude appears to have come
naturally to Montgomery.

Montgomery’s consistent criticism of nearly every
other military and political leader stands out in these
documents. At the top, he laid wood to individuals
such as Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Arthur Tedder,
Arthur Coningham, Bernard Law Alexander, and Henry
Crerar. Churchill is painted as an interfering pain-inthe-neck. General de Gaulle, admittedly a difficult figure,
struck Montgomery as an individual who was “a poor fish
and gives out no inspiration” (p. 144). Montgomery portrayed Eisenhower as a loud, though amiable individual
of limited talent whose “ignorance as to how to run a war
is absolute and complete” (p. 298).

On occasions, Montgomery’s arrows were aimed at
larger groups such as the British War Office, where
Monty lamented that “there is no one in the War Office who is a really good soldier” (p. 94). In this vein,
he decided (correctly) that he had to recast the entire
Normandy invasion plan after he took command of the
invasion ground forces in January 1944. In a February 24, 1944 letter to Admiral Louis Montbatten, Monty
lamented, “Here in England, I found everything and everyone was just drifting along. Rather pathetic really. It
all had to be changed” (p. 54). In an April 1 diary entry,
he minced no words: “The original plan for Overlord was
wrong … many changes had to be made quickly. But the
job has been done; Overlord is now properly ’teed up’
Air Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, air
and the plan is good” (p. 65). Monty motivated those
commander for the Normandy invasion, “is definitely changes by purging the ranks of the invasion planners
above his ceiling in his present job and is not good he inherited and bringing in more than a hundred of his
enough for the job we are on” (p. 58). Monty added own people. He summarized, “We found we had to recast
that Leigh-Mallory was “a gutless bugger” and summa- the operational plan, the administrative plan, and in fact
rized, “I have no use for him” (p. 135). Of Air Marshall
practically everything” (p. 133). Virtually the only figArthur Tedder, the deputy commander of the entire inures of consequence who avoided Montgomery’s rhetorvasion force, Montgomery opined, “he is very weak” (p. ical scythe were Alan Brooke and American 1st Army
167).
commander Omar Bradley, although the latter fell into
Montgomery’s most revealing and pungent com- the category of those Monty classified as unknowledgements usually appear in his personal letters, which of- able, but willing to learn from the master.
ten were dispatched to Alan Brooke, chief of the ImAs the battle in Normandy progressed, it became apperial General Staff. For example, Montgomery told
parent that Montgomery was a risk-averting commanBrooke that Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham, who
der, at least where British and Commonwealth forces
was in charge of tactical air support for the invasion, is were concerned. By August 11, 1944, British and Cana“a bad man, not genuine, and terribly jealous” (p. 166). dian forces had sustained 68,000 casualties, but the AmerGeneral Harold Alexander, who commanded the British icans 102,000. Only 18,000 German prisoners had been
15th Army Group in Italy and who had originally been captured by the British and Canadians by that date, but
proposed by Eisenhower to lead all Normandy invasion
92,000 by the Americans. What was Monty’s reaction to
forces, was castigated by Monty as “definitely third class
frequent charges that the Commonwealth forces he led
as a high commander. It will be interesting to see when were too cautious? “The bigger American casualties are
the P.M., and others, discover that Alexander is no good” due to their lack of skill in fighting” (p. 223). He is fortu(p. 104). Apparently they did not come to that realiza- nate that this comment did not come to light at the time;
tion, since Alexander was made a field marshall in 1945 the pressure to sack him might have become overwhelmand elevated to a peerage in 1946.
ing.
Of General Henry Crerar, the senior Canadian comMontgomery’s public stance in response to critimander, Montgomery complained, “I fear very much that
cism that he was too timid a general was to promise
Harry Crerar will be quite unfit to command any Army…. Eisenhower repeatedly that the British and Canadians
He is very prosy and stodgy, and he is very definitely would undertake sustained offensives, though his own
not a commander” (p. 185). Crerar, averred Monty, “is
2
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private orders consistently undercut that goal. Given the
high level of Commonwealth casualties in World War
I, Monty’s approach was understandable, but came at a
cost to his own reputation. As Beevor has noted, “Senior
American officers were becoming scornful of what they
saw as an inexcusable caution on the British front.”[2]

acknowledged that he benefited from, either there or in
North Africa), U.S. forces were able to repel this attack.
This situation meant that German forces were overextended and plagued by highly vulnerable flanks. With
Canadians and Poles under Monty’s command coming
from the north, and Americans under Patton’s command
coming from the south, the Germans could be cut off and
devastated.

Montgomery acknowledged in his diaries that Eisenhower had prodded him several times to become more
aggressive. His July 22 diary entry states, “Eisenhower
wrote me a letter which expressed concern at my stopping operations on the eastern flank” (p. 233). Several
days later, Eisenhower came to visit: “He talked a good
deal about public opinion in America and … the feeling that the U.S. troops were doing more than the British
troops” (p. 239).

The Falaise gap eventually was closed, but not before many Germans escaped to fight another day. Most
historians believe that Montgomery’s lukewarm orders,
his decision to have the Americans stop short of closing the gap, and his failure to supply reinforcements in
a timely fashion were at fault. Antony Beevor concluded
that this episode “would be disastrous for Montgomery’s
reputation and credibility”[3]. Monty fought such assessMontgomery’s response was to assert repeatedly that ments after the war by authoring eight books, four of
everything was going according to his long-standing which dealt specifically with his war experiences. In sevplan. Representative is his August 4 diary entry (seem- eral, he reasserted his summer 1944 Normandy claim that
ingly written with future historians in mind): “If we ex“present operations are absolutely as planned” (p. 263);
amine the map I used in England when expounding to
however, the weight of historical opinion has not come
all General officers the development of the land battle in down in his favor in this regard.
Normandy, it will be seen that the battle has followed
almost exactly the course prescribed” (p. 269). HowThe picture of Montgomery painted by these docuever, Monty’s own maps belie this statement, for exam- ments (and especially his own letters and diary entries)
ple, with respect to his failure to capture Caen within the is one of a highly knowledgeable and skilled organizer of
first few days of the invasion.
military activity. Monty understood command structure,
the importance of supply and the need for coordination,
One explanation for the slow progress of Commonand the intricacies of reporting relationships. He was a
wealth forces against the Germans was Montgomery’s capable, sometimes even inspiring, speech-maker and ofclaim that his eastern flank of Allied forces frequently ten elicited strong, iconic loyalty from his subordinates.
faced the cream of German armored divisions (often
true). Unable to dislodge the Germans, Monty soon beEven so, he was a man of great self-esteem and pregan to argue that he had deliberately sought out this ar- tense who as early as February 19, 1944 wrote that “the
rangement. “My broad policy, once we had secured a firm nation is beginning to look to me to lead them to viclodgment area, has always been to draw the main enemy tory. The whole of England know me as ’Monty,’ and I
forces into the battle on our eastern flank, and to fight am recognized at once by every man, woman and child,
them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could in the land” (p. 46). Perhaps this self–perception was
proceed the easier” (p. 174). Thus, he flexibly adjusted his why in spring 1944 he proposed a “Public Hallowing of
rhetoric and “his plans” to reflect reality. He also fired the Armed Forces of the Crown” at St. Paul’s Cathedral
several generals to counterattack the claim that he did and suggested that coronation regalia be utilized in the
not push Commonwealth forces hard enough.
ceremony. Not surprisingly, this attempt to evoke the
whiff of royalty inside the senior military hierarchy did
Retrospectively, however, it was the failure of Mont- not fly.
gomery to close the Falaise gap in early August 1944 and
thereby trap the great bulk of German ground forces in
Bernard Montgomery was a successful military comNormandy that has subjected him to more criticism than mander and his mode of operation minimized British
any other of his Normandy decisions. German forces had casualties–an argument that is nonetheless debatable.
undertaken a high-stakes offensive gamble in the form The reality is that Monty harbored few doubts; he beof a tank thrust to the Atlantic coast, designed to cut lieved his view of military affairs was the gospel. ConAllied forces in two. At least partially because of Ul- sequently, he stood ready to belittle anyone who did not
tra code-breaking (an advantage that Montgomery never agree with what he perceived to be his superior analyt3
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ical intellect, unless of course they acquiesced to “learn”
from him.

histories. For most scholars, however, it will be enough
to know that a documentary basis for such conclusions
exists, and on the whole, Monty has not been dealt with
unfairly.

With respect to Montgomery’s Normandy decision
making, Beevor sums Monty up well: “The problem was
that Montgomery, partly for reasons of morale and partly
out of puerile pride, could not admit that any of his plans
had gone wrong.”[4] This issue dims an otherwise illustrious military career.

Notes
[1]. Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy
(New York: Penguin Group, 2009), 185.
[2]. Ibid, 264.

Should you read the original Montgomery documents
Stephen Brooks has provided? Yes, if you wish to inspect
the historical basis for the critical reviews of Monty’s
leadership that have appeared in most recent Normandy

[3] Ibid., 306.
[4] Ibid, 185.
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